GUARANTEED WAGE PLANS: A CONTINUING PROBLEM
UNDER THE FLSA
T HE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT requires that overtime payments be
based on a "regular rate,"' which has been claimed by the Labor Department as the total remuneration for employment in any workweek divided
by the total number of hours actually worked for which such compensation was paid.2 In certain businesses in which employees work irregular
hours, however, a "regular rate" computation of overtime compensation
would burden the employer with increased overtime payments during
periods of greater activity and, thus, preclude an accurate prediction of
,anticipated labor costs. Furthermore, to pay these employees the same
hourly rate during "off-periods" would not afford them the advantages
inherent in a stabilized wage. In an attempt to overcome these practical
difficulties, various types of guaranteed wage plans have been developed.
In the leading case of Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp..4 the Supreme
29 U.S.C..
207(a) (1957).
The statute provides that
an employee, "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," shall
be remunerated for all work in excess of forty hours per week cat a rate not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." Thus, if an employee
is paid at a regular rate of $2.00 per hour, the minimum overtime rate, for all hours
worked over forty in a particular week, would be $3.00.
2 P-H 1956 WAGE-HOUR SERV. I 5,284. In Overnight Motor Transportation Co.
v. Missel, 36 U.S. 572 (2942), the Supreme Court was confronted with a contract for
a weekly salary to be paid employees who worked irregular hours during successive
workweeks. In order to determine whether the minimum wage standard and overtime
provisions of the FLSA had been violated, the Court was compelled to define the statutory
term "regular rate." Under the definition proposed by the Labor Department and
adopted, in substance, by the Court, if a worker is employed at a salary of $120 per
week and works 6o hours in a given week, his regular rate for that week is $2 per
hour ($i2o dividid by 6o). Therefore, for the twenty hours in excess of the forty
hour maximum for straight time payments, the worker will receive $6o (20 x $3 equals
$6o), and, if the employer is to comply with the statute, he must compensate the employee in the amount of $140 (40 x $2 equals $8o plus $6o), or $2o more than was
provided for in the employment contract. See generally, Livengood, Overtime Compensation Under the Fair Labor Standards dct, 2 LAB. L. J. 846 (1951).
aIn general, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to approve guaranteed wage
plans as a device for avoiding the extra overtime payments required by the Missel case,
note 2 supra. See, Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37 (1944); Walling;v.
Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419"(1945); Walling v. Harnischfeger
Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945) 5 14.9 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 (1947) ;
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446 (948),
Comment, 195o Wis. L.
REV. 99.
4 3x6 U.S. 6z4 (194z).
1 52 STAT.

IO63 (1938),
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Court upheld one such plan which provided for a guaranteed" weekly
wage to be paid in any workweek in which remuneration based on a
specified hourly rate plus statutory overtime did not exceed the
guaranty? In the Belo case, the guaranty was, in fact, exceeded for a
significant number of workweeks,' but the 1949 amendments to the
FLSA, which give statutory approval to contracts similar to that involved
in the Belo decision, do not expressly establish this characteristic as a
'The following is an example of a Belo-type agreement: "Weiner is paid under a...
contract, providing a regular rate of $z an hour with a guarantee of $iio a week for
straight-time and overtime. The first week he works 3o hours. His pay at the hourly
rate equals $6o (3o hours x $z), which is less than the $11o guarantee, so he is paid
the guarantee. The second week he works 5o hours. Pay at his regular rate totals
$s1o ([50 x $z] + [so x $I]), the same amount as the guarantee, so again he receives
Siio. The third week he works 55 hours. At his hourly rate he earns $x25 ([55 x
$2] +
[IS x $i]). Since this is more than his guarantee he, is paid the $Xz5." P-H
1956 WAcE-HOUR SERV.
9653.
In the Belo case, the employment contract provided for a "basic rate" of $.67 per
hour for the first forty-four hours. (At that time the maximum workweek under the
FLSA was forty-four hours and the minimum wage was $.z5 per hour.) The contract
guaranteed a weekly wage of $4o. At this stipulated rate no overtime payments in excess
of the guaranty would be due until the hours in the workweek exceeded 543/2. (44.hours
at $.67 equals $29.48 the statutory overtime rate would be 13/ times $.67 or $'; 102
hours of overtime equals $1o.5o, which added to $29.48 equals $39.98, or about $40).
316 U.S. at 628, n. 5. Mr. Justice Reed, in a vigorous dissent in which Justices Black,
Douglas and Murphy concurred, relied on the Missel case, supra note 2, which was
decided on the same day as Belo. Under the definition of "regular rate," adopted in
the former case, the regular rate in the Belo case for a 54/ hour week would be $.73
per hour ($4o divided by 543/). Thus, carrying Missel to its logical conclusion, the
employees would be entitled to receive $.73 per hour for all work up to forty-four hours,
and $x.ogg for all hours in excess of forty-four, or $43.91 per week. 316 U.S. at 639,
n. 3.
The Belo case aroused a veritable storm of adverse comment. See, Notes, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 1077 (19405 27 VA. L. REv. io96 (5941), in which the decision .of the
district court is severely criticized. For discussion of the Supreme Court decision, see,
Tepper, The Belo and Missel Cales and the Overtine Provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of z938, 22 B. U. L. REV. 494 (1942) j Notes, 16 TEMPLE L. Q. 442
(1942) 5 21 TEXAS L. REV. 323 (1943) 5 52 YALE L. J. 159 (1942).
' The contract rate will become operative in fact as the regular rate only if the
guaranty of hours is exceeded, for no employee will receive payments actually determined
by the contract rate until -the employer makes payments in addition to the guaranteed
amount. Assume a contract which calls for a regular rate of $2 per hour with a
guaranteed weekly wage of $140 for all work up to sixty hours. If an employee works
only fifty hours, he receives compensation in excess of the statutory overtime rate ($2
x 40 equals $8o. The $6o remainder of the guaranty is paid to him for only io working hours, or at a rate of $6 per hour, whereas the overtime rate, if the contract rate is
in fact the "regular" hourly rate, is $3). On the basis of the Missel formula, the regular
rate would be $2.80 per hour ($14o divided by 5o hours). However, if the hours of
the guaranty are exceeded, then overtime compensation is actually based on the contract
rate. (40 hours x.$2 equals $8o; 20 hours x $3 equals $6o; $8o plus $6o equals $140,
or the amount of the guaranty), Therefore, unless the guaranty is exceeded, the contract rate becomes a purely fictional basis for computing overtime payments, and the
regular rate requirements of the FLSA are violated. See, LIVENGOOD, THE FEDERAL
WAGE AND HOUR LAW

143 (1952).
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prerequisite of a valid guaranteed wage contract." Unless the guaranty
is so exceeded, however, the regular contract rate becomes a purely artificial basis for computing overtime payments, and the statutory requirement that overtime be based upon a "regular rate" is completely
thwarted. But when an employee eirns in excess of the contract
guaranty, the contract is actually utilized in the computation of overtime.8 Consequently, the Labor Department, in its administration of
the act, has taken the position that the guaranty must be exceeded in a
significant number of workweeks if the underlying purposes of the fortyhour week and overtime provisions of the FLSA are to be served.' On
the other hand, an increasing number of courts have refused to read
this requirement into section 7(e) of the amended act.' 0 The resulting
conflict, as reflected in the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and
Insurance Co.," calls for a reappr4isal of this problem.
In the Hartford case, an employment contract was entered into
which provided for a guaranteed weekly wage for all work up to and
including sixty hours, the statutory maximum for a Belo-type contract
under section 7(e) of the FLSA.' 2 The regular contract rate plus statutory overtime which purported to determine the amount of the guaranty
was mathematically derived from a weekly salary paid to employees for
a forty-four hour workweek prior to the enactment of the 1949 amendments.13 For a two-year period subsequent to the adoption of the con"The relevant portion of the amendments, adding section 7(e) to the act, provides:
"No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this section by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of forty hours if such employee is employed
pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or pursuant to an agreement made as a
result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees, if the duties of such
employee necessitate irregular hours of work, and the contract or agreement (1) specifies a regular rate of pay of not less than the minimum hourly rate ... and compensation
at not less than one and one-half times such rate for all hours worked in excess of forty
in any workweek, and (2) provides a weekly guaranty of pay for not more than sixty
hours based on the rates so specified." 63 STAT. 912 (x949), 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (.952).
sSee note 6 supra.
See P-H 1956 WAGE-HOUR SERV. 9654.4.
10 See cases cited note 21 infra.
21 235 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. x956), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 941 (1956).
2 This particular amendment has been set forth in note 7 supra.
23Assume that an employee formerly received a salary which averaged $97per week
for a forty-four hour workweek. Under such a contract the regularly hourly rate would
have been $2-$8o for 4o hours straight time ($2 x 40) plus $x2 of overtime ($3 x 4),
a total of $92. If the employer then decides to draft a guaranteed wage contract
within the literal meaning of section 7(e), supra note 7, he might, as was done
in the Hartford case, guarantee an employee $92 for a workweek of 6o hours. This
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tract, the sixty-hour guaranty was exceeded in only one-quarter of one
per cent of the workweeks. Nevertheless, an action brought by the
Secretary of Labor to enjoin an alleged violation of the overtime requirements of section 7 was dismissed by the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut.14
On appeal, the Secretary, in urging that the "significant number
of workweeks" test be given judicial approval as the critical determinant
of the validity of guaranteed wage contracts, argued that the 1949
amendments to the FLSA were intended by Congress to incorporate
prior judicial decisions.15 In this connection, heavy reliance was placed
on the fact that in the two pre-i949 Supreme Court decisions in which
Belo-type agreements were approved" the hours of the guaranty were
exceeded for a significant number of workweeks ;" yet, in a series of intervening cases, the Court felt constrained to invalidate guaranteed wage
plans in which the guaranties were not so exceeded.' Furthermore, it
new agreement would require a reduction of the employee's hourly rate to $1.3 1, instead
of $2, and, thus, a reduction of his former overtime rate from $3 to $1.97-4o x $1.31
equals $52.40 which added to $39.40 of overtime (2o x $1.97) equals $91.8o, or approximately $92. Should the employer then elect to work his employees a full sixty
hours under the terms of the guaranty instead of the usual forty-four, he not only
could avoid any overtime payments for the additional sixteen hours, but also would
make overtime payments based on the actual hourly rate of $1.31 rather than the $z
formerly received by the employee: See Petition by the Secretary of Labor for a Writ
of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pp. 13-14 in the case
of Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co., supra note 1 1.
24 12 Wage & Hour Cas. 498 (D. Conn.
1955).
"GThis contention is not without support. Subsequent to the enactment of section
7(e), most writers agreed that the amendment was designed to codify the pre-19'49 decisions of the Supreme Court and, thus, implied the "significant number of workweeks"
test a had been adopted. See, 95 CONG. REC. A- 5 4 7 6 (1949) ; LiVENGOOD, THE
FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW 143 (1952); Brewer, A "Belo" Primer for 195o, i
LAB. L. J. 94, x6o (i95o).
Section 7(e) has also been discussed in its relation to other
amendments adopted in the 1949 revamping of the FLSA. See, in general, Smethurst
and Haslam, The FairLabor Standards Amendments of 1949, i8 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
127 (195o) ; Livengood, Overtime Compensation Under the FLSA, z LAB. L. J. 846
(1951) ; Soule, The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of x94 9-Overtime Compensati0n, 28 N. C. L. REV. 173 (1950).
1 Prior to x949 the Supreme Coprt upheld guaranteed wage plans in only two cases
-the Belo case, supra note 4, and Walling v. Haliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
331 U.S. 17 (947).
2" The Belo contract guaranty was based on a workweek of 5432 hours and was
frequently exceeded. In the Halliburton case, supra note x6, the contract rate did not
become operative until an employee had worked 84 hours, but the guaranty was surpassed in 20% of the workweeks. Note, however, that the Halliburton contract would
now be invalid under section 7(e) which limits a weekly guaranty to 6o hours. See
note 7 supra.
The Secretary of Labor has adopted the zo% figure as a rule of thumb for determining what is a "significant" number of workweeks. P-H 1956 WAGE-HOUR SERV.
19654.4.
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was asserted, Congress incorporated this purported pre-i949 decisional
law into section 7(e), by implication at least, in the statutory requirements of a "regular rate" and a "bona fide" contract."' For, until the
guaranty is exceeded, the contract rate will never become "regular"i.e., operative in fact. Moreover, it was argued, if an employment contract is to be deemed "bona fide" within the meaning of the act, there
must be an attempt, in good faith, to draft its terms in such a manner that
the contract hourly rate will constitute the "regular" rate; 20 and this
good faith, the Secretary contended, can only be shown by an exceeding
of the guaranty for a significant number of workweeks.
The lower federal courts, however, have generally evinced a reluctance to read the "significant number of workweeks" test into section
7(e) .21 Initially, these courts had been thrown into confusion by the

-

" While the Supreme Court has never expressly adopted the "significant number of
workweeks" formula, its pre-1949 decisions permit an inference that the Court recognized
this test. Subsequent to the Belo decision in 1942, the Court held invalid other types
of guaranteed wage plans which deviated, to some extent, from one or more of the
elements present in Belo. See cases cited in note 3 supra. These decisions led many
to believe that Belo had been overruled except as to its own particular facts. Walling
v. Uhlmann Grain Co., S1 F.zd 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1945). When the Court granted
certiorari in the Halliburton case, supra note 16, it was predicted, on the basis of the
decisions following Belo and the views expressed by individual members of the Court
in those intervening cases, that Belo would be overruled. Levy, Belo Revisited, 15 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 39 (1946).
However, the Court in Halilburton reaffirmed Belo as
good law and held it to be controlling because of substantially identical fact situations.
Only in Belo and Halliburtonwas the contract guaranty exceeded in a significant number
of workweeks. For a mathematical-legal critique of the cases intervening between
Belo and Halliburton, see Feldman, Algebra and the Supreme Court, 40 ILL. L. REV.
489 (1946). After the Halliburton decision, the former Administrator of the WageHour Division of the Labor Department voiced an appeal for legislative amendment.
Walling, The Search for Finality in Wage and Hour Litigation, 17 FORDHAM L. REV.
2oo (1948).
The pertinent provisions of this section are set forth in note 7 supra.
0 The soundness of this argument is questionable because of the words of section
7(e), supra note 7, which seem to limit the scope of "bona fide" to a modification of
the words "individual contract." Clearly, "bona fide" does not modify "an agreement
made as a result of collective bargaining," and, therefore, it would require an extremely
flexible interpretation of the statute to sustain the Secretary's contention that "bona
fide" applies to all types of contracts envisioned in section 7(e).
2 The decisions of the district courts and the courts of appeals have reflected, since
1949, a judicial desire to achieve a formerly elusive uniformity of decision by a strict
construction of the "Belo" amendment. In Mitchell v. Brandtien & Kluge, Inc.,
228 F.2d 291 (ist Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 940 (956),
the First Circuit
held that the "significant number pf workweeks" test was not necessary to determine
the validity of guaranteed wage plans since it ivas not specifically alluded to by Congress
in section 7(e).
.In Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co., 202 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1953) , cert. denied,
346 U.S. 832- 1953), the employer had formerly satisfied the significant number of workweeks requirement, but, due to increased efficiency in his plant, had reduced the number
of working hours of his employees to the extent that the guaranty was not exceeded
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seemingly irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court in the period
1942-4722 and, consequently, the enactment of the I949 amendments
for several years. Nevertheless, he continued to pay the guaranteed wage. "The test
applied in each case is whether the wage rate specified in the contract of employment is
. . . in fact the actual rate paid for the normal non-overtime workweek. Contracts
of employment in which the stipulated hourly rate bears no relation to the compensation
guaranteed by the contract are violative of the Act. Contracts in which, as in the present
case, the guaranteed compensation is actually predicated upon and computed by the
stipulated wage rate meet all requirements of the Act." (Emphasis added.) zoz F.zd
at 238. However, under the Secretary's construction of the statute the contract rate in
the Little Rock Packing Co. case would not be "regular."
Subsequent to its decision in the Hartford case, supra note ii, the Second Circuit in
Mitchell v. Feinberg, 236 F.zd 9 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 943 (1956),
sustained a guaranteed wage plan in a brief per curiam opinion citing the Hartford
decision as controlling. However, Circuit Judge Waterman, who wrote the opinion in
Hartford, dissented vigorously in Feinberg. In the latter case, the employment contract provided for a regular rate and overtime pay with a guaranteed wage based on
a 48 hour workweek. No employee ever worked over 4o hours in any workweek. If
an employee was absent from work for a day, the employer reduced his pay by one-fifth
of the guaranty. Thus, an employee received, in lieu of the guaranteed wage, payments including overtime for working less than 4o hours per week. Since, in effect,
there was no guaranteed wage, Judge Waterman contented that the employees must be
paid on the basis of the regular contract rate. "[T-ihe provision in appellant Feinberg's
:ollective bargaining agreement by which appellant pays overtime compensation for
non-overtime work clearly demonstrates that there was no compliance-and no intent
to comply-with the requirements that a 'regular rate' of pay be paid for a workweek
of forty hours or less. . . ." 236 F.zd at io-it.
These decisions indicate that the courts of appeals will continue to sustain any
guaranteed wage contract which meets the literal requirements of section 7(e), regardless of a failure to satisfy the approved definition of "regular rate." See note z supra
and text thereto. Several federal district courts have, however, at least implicitly recognized the "significant number of workweeks" test. Sikes v. Williams Lumber Co., 123
F. Supp. 853 (E.D. La. 1954); Tobin v. Morristown Poultry Co., so Wage & Hour
Cas. 571 (E.D. Tenn. 195z); Tobin v. Aronow, 96 F. Supp. 279 (D. Mont. 1951);
Tobin v. Beechwood Lumber Co., so Wage & Hour Cas. 444- (N.D. Ga. 1951).
2 In Green Head Bit & Supply Co. v. Hendricks, 49 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Okla.
1943), the district court was confronted with a wage contract which provided for a
guaranteed weekly salary based on a'nhourly rate and overtime pay. The employer,
however, varied the hourly rate in his books each week, depending on the number of
hours worked. The contract rate was completely disregarded in favor of a rate found
weekly through mathematical computation. The court upheld the contract on the
ground that the rate varied from week to week and not within a particular week, citing
Overnight Motor TransportationCo. v. Missel, note 2 supra. The court was apparently
impressed with the fact that the employees were pleased with the arrangement and
only the Labor Department appeared dissatisfied. But cf. Walling v. L. J. Mueller
Furnace Co., 5o F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Wis. 1943), where on similar facts a contract was
invalidated on the ground that it lacked a regular rate specified in the contract and was
therefore not analogous to a Belo-type agreement. See also, 14.9 Madison Ave. Corp.
v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 (94.7) ; Walling v. United Distillers Products Corp., 63 F.
Supp. 474 (D. Conn. z94.5).
In Lynch v. Vincent, 55 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Mo. 1944), an employment contract
provided for a weekly wage based on a regular rate and overtime payments geared to a
56 hour workweek. Because there were no fluctuating hours during successive workweeks, the Belo case was held not to apply although the contract was upheld since the
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provided an apparent basis for needed uniformity from which the courts
have hesitated to depart. Adhering to this pattern, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in the instant case, unanimously affirmed the trial
court, pointing out, by way of justification, that Congress had excluded
the "significant number of workweeks" test when its incorporation in the
amendments was proposed, and that Congress could easily have manifested its alleged intention by explicitly including the test within the
context of section 7(e).23
This decision, however, unfortunately demonstrates a failure to
recognize the practical realities of a situation in which such a literal construction of section 7(e) may permit abuses24 that would seriously frusemployees worked a 56 hour week and, therefore, the contract rate was equal to the
actual hourly rate.
In Walling v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 151 F.2d 381 ( 7 th Cir. 1945), the Seventh
Circuit expressed the opinion that the Belo decision was effective only as to its own
particular facts and, on that ground, invalidated the contract in question. Following
the decision of the Supreme Court in Halliburton, supra note 16, the same court in
McComnb vz. Pacific & Atlantic Shippers 4ss'n., 175 F.2d 411 (7 th Cir. 1949), 98 U.
PA. L. REV. 264 (1949), followed the Belo rule in sustaining an employment contract
in which the guaranty had not been exceeded in a significant number of workweeks,
The court found that the employees were pleased with the scheme and that there had
been no violation of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. But cf.,
McComb v. Sterling Ice & Cold Storage Co., 165 F.ad 265 (ioth Cir. 1947), in which
the court held that a Belo-type contract, in order to be valid, must be executed il good
faith and, therefore, the guaranty must be exceeded for a significant number of 'workweeks.
A contract similar to the Belo plan in every respect, except the number of hours
upon which the guaranty was based, was upheld through reliance upon the Belo decision, although the court indicated that it viewed the Belo rule as applicable only in
McComb v. Utica Knitting Co., 164 F.zd 670 (2d
an extremely narrow situation.
Cir. 1947).
See also, McComb v. Roig, 181 F.2d 726 (ist Cir. 595o), in which the First
Circuit held that the "significant number of workweeks" test was the correct determinant
of validity of a guaranteed wage plan since it precluded the possibility of an artificial
contract rate. (This case involved recovery of overtime payments for workweeks prior
to the 1949 amendments.) But in Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., supra note as,
the same court in a subsequent decision requiring a judicial application of section 7(c)
reached the opposite conclusion.
"The legislative history of section 7(e), supra note 7, is inconclusive insofar as it
concerns the question of whether Congress expressly rejected the "significant number
of workweeks" test when various bills were introduced. All of the bills were broad
in scope, covering many proposed amendments, and were not limited to section 7(e).
Therefore, rejection of one cannot be said to indicate preference for another insofar as
each related to one small provision of several amendments. Petition by the Secretary of
Labor for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit pp. 08-21 in the case of Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co., supra note xi. See also, LIVENGOOD, THE FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW
x4-i6 (1952).
"' The possible abuses of the overtime provisions of the FLSA are illustrated in the
hypothetical situation presented in note 13 supra.
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trate thie policies which the act was designed to implement, 25 a result that
the Secretary's construction of the statute is designed to minimize. For,
while the inherent rigidity of the standard that the Secretary has adopted
imposes limitations upon the employer's freedom to contract, substantially all of the benefits of a guaranteed wage are still available to both
employer and employees if the number of hours of the guaranty are
fixed sufficiently low to insure compliance with the "significant number
of workweeks" test. Yet, application of this prophylactic standard, while
executing underlying congressional policies, could conceivably lead to
harsh results in a particular case. Thus, if an employer enters into a
Belo-type agreement with a bona fide and reasonable expectation that
the guaranty will be exceeded in a significant number of workweeks, and
subsequently, due to peculiar conditions existing in the industry, his employees' working hours so decrease that the guaranty is never exceeded,
the Secretary's test, if applied, would invalidate the contract, despite
the employer's willingness to continue to pay the weekly guaranteed
wage because of an honestly held belief that conditions would improve. 26
Accordingly, in order to effect a compromise that will embody the
"significant number of workweeks" test and yet permit of an exception
for the "honest" employer, it is suggested that the test should be so modified that a failure to satisfy it will raise, at most, a presumption that the
contract is invalid. Thus, if the guaranty were not exceeded in a significant number of workweeks, the contract would be regarded as prima facie
2 The Fair Labor Standards Act, with its minimum wage and overtime provisions,

was initially enacted during a period of economic depression in order to make more
jobs available for the vast numbers of unemployed by imposing a fifty per cent premium
to be paid all employees working over a certain number of hours per week. These.
policy considerations, have diminished in importance during the present era of inflation
and nearly full employment, but the minimum wage and overtime sections of the act
have been retained because of a public desire to alleviate unsatisfactory working conditions.
2 In Mitchell v. .ldams, 230 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1956), the employer was engaged
in the manufacture of shirts. However, due to circumtsances beyond his control, the
volume of his business dropped off sharply with the result that his employees who were
employed under the terms of a Belo-type agreement did not work enough hours in any
workweek to receive compensation in excess of the guaranty. The employer was found to
have contemplated that the guaranty would be exceeded for a significant number
of workweeks. The failure of section 7(e), supra note 7, to provide for the "significant number of workweeks" requirement, together with a finding that the employer
had a bona fide belief that conditions would change and, thus, enable him to exceed the
guaranty, was deemed sufficient to sustain the contract. This rationale of the Fifth
Circuit resembles the "good faith" reasoning of the court in McComb v. Sterling Ice &
Cold Storage Co., supra note 22, although the Tenth Circuit in that case required a
showing of satisfaction of the "significant number of workweeks" test in order to establish good faith.
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invalid, and it would then be incumbent iupon the employer to show that,
at the time the contract was entered into, he was justified, under the
circumstances, in believing that the guaranty would be so exceeded.
This compromise solution not only would substantially achieve the results sought by the Secretary of Labor, but would also assure some degree of flexibility in an otherwise unduly rigorous formula. The marked
refusal of the lower federal courts to incorporate the Secretary's test into
the FLSA by means of judicial interpretation, however, will necessitate
effectuation of this scheme by means of congressional amendment of
section 7(e),
"'If an employer drafts an employment contract in %n honestly held belief that
the guaranty will be exceeded, "and subsequently he finds that conditions will prevent an
exceeding of the guaranty, he cannot be permitted to maintain indefinitely that he bona
fide believes that these conditions will improve. Therefore, the courts will have to adopt
an arbitrary period during which an employer can raise this good faith defense, so that
if, upon expiration of that period, he does not revise the contract guaranty to meet
the requirements of the "significant number of workweeks" test, his defense will be lost
to him.

